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This paper analyzes the dynamism among Korea’s Constitution (institution), national 
agenda (economic reform), and leadership (president) by comparing the 1948 National 
Founding Constitution (NFC), which pursued an “equal economy” and a “market economy,” 
with the 1954 Post-Korean War Constitution (PKWC).  
First, under the condition of the postcolonial agenda on land reform, the NFC promoted 
a socialist market economy that stipulated strong involvement by the state in the economy or 
an equal economic system of social democracy and not a liberal market economy. This was in 
line with the republican tradition that had existed since the Korean Provisional Government. 
Second, through the active use of the NFC, the South Korean government and President 
Syngman Rhee (Yi Sŭngman) executed a policy of land reform—the biggest national agenda 
at the time—which led to the downfall of the radical left and had a decisive influence on 
the expansion of farmer support for the government. The landlord class and the Korean 
Democratic Party were also weakened. These outcomes were a result of a combination 
of a key national agenda (land reform), the principles of the Constitution, and Korea’s 
presidential leadership. 
Third, Korea’s Constitution was transformed to promote a market economic system after 
the Korean War. The change in the spirit of the Constitution was due to the achievements 
of postcolonial reform through the success of land reform and the collapse of the left along 
with the emergence of a new national agenda to support postwar reconstruction and secure 
foreign aid. The constitutional basis for a market economy system was not laid out in the 
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NFC but in the PKWC. 
Fourth, the amendment of the articles on the economy in the PKWC was done 
as a consequence of American demands. The US regarded the NFC as a Constitution 
that promoted ‘state socialism.’ As a result of the socialist orientation of the NFC and 
Washington’s strong objection to it, a tense confrontation regarding the matters of the state’s 
role in the constitutional articles and in the economy emerged. However, due to the need to 
secure American aid, Korea was obliged to amend the articles on the economy to support 
the US-backed market economy system. Washington felt the need to block the South Korean 
government’s excessive involvement in the economy unless it was aimed at a market economy 
system and tried to establish this through a constitutional amendment. 
Fifth, Syngman Rhee, who had been opposed to the amendment in the face of American 
pressure, used a strategy of exchange with regard to both Korean politics and the economy 
as well its power structure and economic system to ensure his third consecutive run for the 
presidency and to secure aid from the US. From a state development point of view, Rhee’s 
strategy was a combination of “the regression of democracy, [and the] development of the 
market economy.” Regarding the effects and consequences of the amendment, the PKWC 
led to a change in the Korean economic system and Korea’s entry into the market economy 
system, an increase in American aid and changes in the aid package, the success of post-war 
reconstruction, and the establishment of the basis of the Korean market economy.
More than anything else, the constitutional amendment heavily influenced the quantity 
and quality of American aid and thus provided a legal and institutional tool for Korea’s 
postwar economic development. In addition, the constitutional amendment provided 
enabling conditions as well as confining conditions in the trajectory of the development of 
Korean society as seen in the fact that the norms and spirit of the Constitution at the time of 
the amendment are still maintained without fundamental changes in Korea even today.
Through a comparison of the NFC and the PKWC, the success in mutual correspondence 
and relational dynamics among South Korea’s early national agenda, the Constitution, and 
national leadership is clearly shown. In other words, there is a very strong correlation among 
the national agendas as regards land reform and post-war reconstruction, the principle and 
articles of the Constitution, and Korean leadership.
Keywords: National Agenda, Constitutional Change, Presidential Leadership, American 
Influence, National Founding Constitution, Post-Korean War Constitution
I. INTRoDUcTIoN
Recently, there has been increased interest, both academic and practical, 
in Korea’s constitution in Korean society. This seems to be a product of 
an understanding that numerous social and political problems in Korea 
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stem from institutional, and even more so, constitutional factors. The 
increased interest and research on the constitution not only focuses on 
the current democratic constitution, which was established after the June 
Democracy Movement in 1987, but also extends to the time when modern 
constitutionalism was introduced to Korea (Suh 2006). This is a current 
issue that has provoked a need for tracing its historical origin and path. 
Even in academia, the issue of the constitution goes beyond the disciplines 
of constitutional studies and political science; it is widely spread over 
philosophy, women’s studies, international relations, history, sociology, peace 
studies, and cultural studies (citizen’s Action ed., 2007). Today, the issue 
of the constitution cannot be avoided when attempting to explain Korean 
politics and social problems. 
Focusing on the time of the founding of the Republic of Korea, this 
paper seeks to analyze the correlation between leadership and national 
agenda through the lens of the constitution. In other words, it analyzes the 
dynamism among Korea’s national agenda, constitution, and leadership. 
While there is no previous analysis that correlates these three variables, this 
paper offers an in-depth analysis based on primary sources of the relationship 
among the national agenda (economic reform), leadership (president), and 
the institution (constitution) in the early years of the Republic of Korea. 
Specifically, this paper tries to explain this relationship by analyzing the 
constitution’s articles on the economy in the National Founding constitution 
and in the Post-Korean War constitution. That is, it compares the differences 
in the principles, spirit, and contents of the National Founding constitution 
and the Post-Korean War constitution and seeks to find the reasons and 
process that led to these differences. 
In terms of sources, this paper seeks to find and analyze new facts using 
primary sources from not only within Korea but also from the US National 
Archive, which have thus far not been used in research (both in Korean and 
in other languages) on South Korea’s early politics and constitution. These 
primary sources are important in that they empirically and analytically 
connect the lacunae in academia, through new historical facts, with the 
relationship between constitutional changes in modern Korea and Korea-
United States relations and the Korean national agenda and its leadership. 
More broadly, it can be said that this new material fills the void in the 
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research on the constitution of modern Korea, Korea’s economic institution, 
and Korea-US relations. 
The dynamics among the national agenda, constitution (institution), 
and leadership is an area that has rarely been dealt with in the disciplines 
of international relations, constitutional studies, history, and economics. 
However, the dynamics among the three elements enables us to analyze 
Korea’s politics, economics, constitution, presidential leadership, and relations 
with the United States systematically. The constitution, as a part of the 
institution, is an object of integrated studies, where politics and law studies 
as well as reality analysis and a normative approach come together. It could 
also be the most appropriate means of inter-disciplinary research through 
its deconstruction of traditional boundaries in the relationships between 
leadership, institution, and social conditions. 
The constitution is one of the fundamental elements through which one 
may objectively come to know a country’s politics, regime, and development 
of democracy as well as its characteristics, identity, ideologies, economic 
system, and judicial system. An in-depth study on a country’s nation-
building, regime, and democracy is inconceivable without research on 
its constitution. It is impossible to understand a country’s formation, 
development, and characteristics fully without a close examination of the 
spirit, process, characteristics, conditions, influences, and consequences of 
the constitution. Thus, it is ironic that research on the constitution based 
on primary sources has been largely ignored despite the explosive growth 
in research on post-1980s South Korea in the fields of politics, economics, 
history, and constitutional studies. Therefore, this paper examines the 
dynamics among the Korean constitution/institution, national agenda/social 
condition, and leadership with a true inter-disciplinary mindset.  
Prior research on the “Post-Korean War constitution” from the fields 
of constitutional studies, political science, and history has focused mainly 
on interpreting the reorganization of the power structure, as the expression 
Sasaoip kaehŏn (rounding off to the nearest integer in a constitutional 
amendment) symbolizes. However, in terms of content and influence, the 
1954 constitution was more important in the transformation of the national 
economic system than of the power structure. Above all, it was through 
the “Post-Korean War constitution” that Korea finally adopted the market 
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economy system, established not in 1948 but in 1954. The consolidation 
of the division of the peninsula and the South Korean-US alliance in the 
aftermath of the Korean War together have been viewed as the two major 
elements that stipulated the Post-Korean War system. In addition, the market 
economy system has become a major element in the national institution. The 
two major factors that have come to define modern Korea’s international 
relations—the Korean-US alliance and the introduction of a capitalist market 
economy—were introduced at the time of the formation of the “Post-Korean 
War system,” not during the nation’s founding in 1948. In other words, Korea’s 
basic national system was founded in 1953, not in 1948. Major questions that 
this paper seeks to answer are as follows:
First, regarding basic facts, this paper shows what the 1948 National 
Founding constitution (NFc) and the 1954 Post-Korean War constitution 
(PKWc) respectively state with regard to the economy and tries to clarify 
what their basic principles and orientations were. What do they have in 
common and what are their differences? These are questions that have not 
been dealt with sufficiently in the fields of constitutional studies, political 
science, and history. 
Second, what caused the changes made in regards to the economy in 
the constitutions? What were the agents, main causes, and processes of the 
changes? This paper deals with this under-studied topic. Why did Korea 
drastically change its National Founding constitution?
Third, what is the relationship between the national agenda and the spirit 
of the constitution (or the principle of the constitution and the establishment 
of a national agenda)? Is it a close relationship? Is there any correlation 
between the 1948 National Founding constitution and the key national 
agenda on land reform during the time, and between the 1954 Post-Korean 
War constitution and the two key national agendas of its day: obtaining US 
aid and post-Korean War reconstruction? In answering these questions we 
can clarify the background and process of certain clauses that were added 
to the later constitution as well as observe the role of the constitution in the 
realization of national agendas. 
Fourth, how and with what understanding did Korea’s national leadership, 
especially that of Syngman Rhee, who was president throughout much of 
this period, attemptattempts to utilize the constitution for the fulfillment of a 
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national key agenda? The answers would show clearly the correlation among 
the 1948 National Founding constitution, land reform, and Rhee’s leadership, 
as well as the correlation among the 1954 Post-Korean War constitution, 
securing US aid and post-war reconstruction, and Rhee’s leadership. The 
correlation and dynamics among the three—the constitution as an institution, 
land reform, securing US aid; post-war reconstruction as a key national 
agenda; and national leadership—best exemplify the three elements of a 
modern democracy: national agenda, institution, and leadership. In short, 
clarification of the utilization and role of the constitution helps to evaluate 
the ability of a leadership structure that uses institutions for the realization of 
social agendas. 
Lastly, what are the two constitutions’ micro and macro influences on 
Korea’s modern constitution, constitutional government, and economic 
management? The answer to this question would clarify the real and practical 
influence that an institutional change generates. It would have certain 
implications for the current argument for a constitutional amendment. 
II.  THE NATIoNAL FoUNDINg coNSTITUTIoN AND THE 
BEgINNINg oF THE EARLY EcoNoMIc SYSTEM: THE  
EcoNoMIc SYSTEM oF EqUALITY
What were the spirit and principles of the 1948 National Founding 
constitution that defined the economic system of the newly formed Republic 
of Korea? From the beginning, the National Founding constitution aimed 
simultaneously at market fundamentalism as well as state socialism.1 In 
other words, the National Founding constitution (NFc) was, as the author 
of its first draft wrote, “abolishing the system of an individualistic capitalist 
country,” seeking to do so “…while adopting the socialistic principle of 
equality, aims for the realization of a new type of state that harmonizes and 
1 The following contents are a summary and revision of Park, Myung Lim’s 
(“constitutionalism and Democracy in South Korea: Mixed government and Social 
Market Economy”, Korean Political Science Review Vol. 37, No. 1, 2003: 113-134, The 
Korean Political Science Association.
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amalgamates the strengths of individualistic capitalism, i.e., the freedom and 
equality of individuals and the valuing of creative ideas” (Yu 1949: 177). It 
is very surprising that even under the US military occupation, South Korea 
began with “abolishing the system of an individualistic capitalist country,” 
when today a capitalist market economy is considered as the zeitgeist and the 
basis for the national economic system.
The establishment of an economic democracy at the time of the 
founding of Korea has been termed “the biggest characteristic of Korea’s 
constitution” (Ibid., 10). By declaring in its preamble “To provide for the 
fullest development of the equality of each individual in all fields of political, 
economic, social and cultural life . . .  To permit every person to discharge 
his duties and responsibilities . . . To promote the welfare of the people,”2 
the National Founding constitution aimed to establish equal economy as 
the fundamental goal of the constitution (Ibid., 15). Article 84 also had 
a strong constitutional restraint on a liberal market economy system by 
stipulating: “The principle of the economic order of the Korean Republic 
shall be to realize social justice, to meet the basic demands of all citizens, 
and to encourage the development of a balanced economy. Within the limits 
of the foregoing paragraph the economic freedom of each individual shall 
be guaranteed.” The architects of the constitution designed this article to 
emphasize “the development of a balanced economy,” which put equality 
ahead of competition as “the principle of the economic order of the Korean 
Republic” (Ibid., 176).
The articles that discuss the development of a balanced national economy 
are strongly and thoroughly against a market economy. The contents declare, 
“Mines and other important mineral resources, marine resources, water 
power, and natural powers which may be utilized economically shall be 
owned by the State. In order to utilize and develop such resources, licenses 
shall , in case of necessity, be granted for a limited period to private persons 
in accordance with the provisions of law and shall be canceled in accordance 
2 Translator’s note: The quotes of the Constitution are from the official translation that 
was agreed to between the Secretary General of the Korean National Assembly and 
the US. Liaison Office (copy received by the editor from the Department of State, 
Washington, in August, 1948). 
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with the provisions of law.” (Article 85) and “Important transportation and 
communication enterprises, financial and insurance institutions, electricity, 
irrigation, water supply, gas and any enterprises having public character shall 
be owned and managed by the government or by the  public. Foreign trade 
shall be under the control of the government” (Article 87). Such statements 
consistently stipulate the state’s strong involvement in the economy and 
disavow a liberal market economy by defining state-owned and government-
controlled management of the  public  like a social market economy. It is 
not an exaggeration to say that these clauses appear to support a socialist 
constitution. 
However, Article 15 of the National Founding constitution had a principle 
that not only stopped at constricting a liberal market economy but also 
eschewed a centrally planned socialist economy: “The right of property shall 
be guaranteed. Its nature and restrictions shall be defined by law. The exercise 
of property rights shall conform to the public welfare. Expropriation, use, 
or restriction of private property for public purposes shall be accompanied 
by due compensation in accordance with the provisions of law” (Ibid., 45). 
The principles in the articles on the economy in the National Founding 
constitution therefore could be described—from the fact that it combined 
the procedure of a market economy, government involvement, liberal market 
economy, and a planned economy—as approaching a third way or the social 
market economy of post-war Europe.3 
The fact that the Republic of Korea abolished the individualistic market 
economy system through the National Founding constitution when it 
was occupied by the US and that present day Korea thoroughly supports a 
capitalistic market economy points to a major research topic that must be 
given proper academic attention. Research needs to clearly show when, why, 
and through what process the capitalist market economy was introduced. 
3 However, it does not necessarily mean that South Korea had a social market economy 
system. It can be said that South Korea, borrowing from the wording of that time, 
utilized an equal economic system. The recent constitution of the European Union 
revised ‘social market economy’ of the postwar era into ‘a highly competitive social 
market economy’ and embraces it as the goal of Europe as a whole. EU constitution 
Article I-3: The Union’s objectives, Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 
Official Journal of the European Union, Vol. 47 (16 Dec. 2004), c310/11.
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Most of all, it came about through a reflection of the Korean spirit and the 
history of a long constitutional revolution within modern Korea—including 
its Provisional government—rather than from US pressure or the mere 
import of a specific ideology from the West (Park, M. 2003: 115-117). In other 
words, it was the extension of a time-honored emphasis on the pursuit of 
equality, republicanism, the doctrine of Equality of Three (politics, economy, 
and education) and public property. The architects of the constitution made 
sure that the articles discussing economics either reflected republicanism 
or the economic idea of equality that had been utilized since the Korean 
Provisional government during the Japanese colonial period—Preamble, 
Article 15, 84, 85, and 87—and which rejected the classic market economy by 
positing “economic and social democracy.”4
The National Founding constitution declared that the “duty” of property 
rights should promote in an appropriate manner the welfare of the public, 
thus making the protection of property rights non-absolute. However, by 
stipulating that the expropriation, use, or restriction of private property for 
public purposes must be accompanied by due compensation in accordance 
with the law, it also included declarations that clearly reject forfeiture without 
compensation, free distribution, and the denial of private property (Yu 1949: 
45-47). To emphasize the point again, the fundamental spirit of the National 
Founding constitution was the sublation of both capitalism and socialism 
as well as the market economy and a planned economy. The US occupation 
forces, which had a policy of transplanting a market economy system in the 
face of socialism, regarded the articles on economy in Korea’s the National 
4 As the architects of the constitution mentions, the Fc was less a mere embracing of 
the Weimar constitution (Weimarer Verfassung) than an extension of the system 
and design ever since the Provisional government (Yu 1952: 26). This is similar to 
the chinese pursuit of capitalism and socialism simultaneously since the Nationalist 
Revolution and shares characteristics of a third way that was booming in East Asia. 
This needs further in-depth study together with the fact that the constitution of 
the Provisional government, which is considered as the forerunner of the Fc, was 
strongly influenced by the chinese constitution. Refer to Simei qing, From Allies 
to Enemies: Vision of modernity, Identity, and U.S.- China Diplomacy, 1945-1960 
(cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2007) for research on the third way and the 
mixed economy in china. 
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Founding constitution as “a kind of state socialism.” (sic)5 As will be 
explained later in this paper, this perception and assessment by the US shows 
how minor the American influence was in the legislation of the articles on the 
economy in the NFc, which later prompted Washington’s persistent efforts to 
change the economic articles to that of a market economy orientation. 
In terms of the national agenda, the issue of land reform was central; 
not only was it necessary to break the colonial economic system, but it 
was also the core national agenda that would determine the direction of 
the economic system as well as the democratic path of the newly formed 
country in terms of national administration—including the status of land 
ownership, the demands for political and social parties, the occupation policy 
of the military government, farmers protests, and competition with North 
Korea. In other words, the issue of land reform as a key national agenda was 
directly related to the issue of what type of prospects a post-colonial, newly 
formed country would have. In South Korea at the time when colonial rule 
ended in 1945, the total farmland owned by landlords and the necessary 
distribution was 1,447,000 chŏngbo.6 (government-vested farmland: 269,000 
chŏngbo. Landlord-owned farmland: 1,178,000 chŏngbo.)7 This extremely 
unequal structure of land ownership had been a resource for the radical 
left. Even after the distribution of land under the USMg (United States 
Military government) at the end of 1948, 1,024,000 chŏngbo remained to be 
distributed (Ibid., 20), an enormous amount. By the time real land reform 
began in June of 1949 under Rhee’s government, 833,881 chŏngbo of land was 
to be distributed. (government-vested farmland: 232,832 chŏngbo. Landlord-
owned farmland: 601,049 chŏngbo.)8
The will and strategy of Rhee was firm and clear when he became the 
5 “Report on Economic Provisions of the constitution of the Republic of Korea” 
(March 24, 1954), National Archives (Maryland), Record group (Rg) 469, REcoRDS 
oF THE US FoREIgN ASSISTANcE AgENcIES, 1948-61, office of Far Eastern 
operations, Korea Subject Files. 1953-59, Entry 422, Box 20. The same materials are, 
in a different categorization, also included in the following documents: Rg 84, Foreign 
Service Posts of the Department of State, Korea Embassy general Records, 1953-1955.
6 Translator’s Note: one chŏngbo is about one hectare.
7 Department of Farmland at the Ministry of Agriculture 1951: 18.
8 Ibid., 42-43.
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leader of the new independent nation. Shortly after the enactment of the 
constitution, Rhee repeatedly emphasized –beginning with his opening 
address to the National Assembly before the establishment of the government 
(May 31, 1948) and throughout his statements on the administrative policy 
while president of the RoK—the elimination of the dilemma of autocratic-
capitalistic land ownership, the granting of autonomy to the farming 
economy, the abolition of the tenant-farming system, the establishment of the 
land-to-tiller principle, and the urgency and importance of land reform based 
on equal land distribution. He proclaimed that a land reform law would be, 
first of all, enacted for all of this.9 It showed his determination for the national 
agenda in regards to post-colonial economic reform. 
In fact, contrary to popular understanding, Rhee leaned favorably towards 
a communistic economic policy after the end of colonial rule—or  at least 
he was willing to actively embrace the economic policy of communism. 
In Kŏn’guk kwa isang (The Founding of the Nation and Ideals), Rhee’s first 
book after his return to Korea, he revealed his feelings towards the design 
of the founding of the nation, stating, “Basically, I’m a person who has good 
feelings towards communism” … “I agree with its [communism] ideology 
to a certain degree” … “Later, there will be many things from communism 
that our government can adopt when making economic policy” and “By 
reforming capitalism and class egotism, the farmer can have land; the poor, 
consciousness” (Rhee 1945: 22). He continues by saying, “I can talk about 
communists in two parts; first is a group of people who argue to adopt 
economic policies for the welfare of the working class. I somewhat agree 
with this communism” (Ibid., 23). These statements show Rhee’s progressive 
plans for the economy. To formulate a constitutional basis for land reform, 
the clause “Farmland shall be distributed to self-tilling farmers. The method 
of distribution, the extent of possession, and the nature and restrictions 
of ownership shall be determined by law” was added to Article 86 of the 
NFc (Yu 1949: 181). While all of the specific statements in the land reform 
9 “President’s Statements on the Administrative Policy”, 1986, National Assembly 
Secretariat, Progress Report of the Constitutional Assembly, 305-306; Robert oliver, 
1979, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 1942-1960, 152-153 (Seoul: 
Panmun Book company).
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clauses were put into law, the declaration that “farmland shall be distributed 
to self-tilling farmers” was defined as its essential spirit and immediately 
became an article in the constitution at the time of the founding of the 
country. The fact that these clauses were included in the National Founding 
constitution shows Rhee’s awareness of the issues regarding land. If these 
clauses had been absent, land reform itself would have reached an impasse 
and might have been impossible (Kim et al. 1989: 434-452, 999-1000, 1005). 
Therefore, the addition of an article on land reform to the constitution was 
beyond the sphere of the norm and had enormous practical, political, and 
social implications. With land reform as a national agenda, post-colonial 
Korea could be effective and successful. The progressive land reform policies 
prevented protests from the landlord class as well as peasant revolutions, thus 
becoming the basis for the future industrial development that would spread 
socioeconomic equality. South Korea had therefore laid the cornerstone with 
land reform in the constitution. 
Just as important as the constitutional norms and national leadership 
was the organization of the bureaucracy to execute the national agenda. To 
succeed in land reform, Rhee appointed former communist cho Pongam, 
who would later become his biggest political rival, as the Minister of 
Agriculture. It was a decision that was widely hailed as against the people’s 
expectations. With cho as the head and Vice Minister Kang chŏngt’aek, 
Director of Farmland Kang chin guk, and three left-leaning individuals 
(Yun T’aekchung, Pae Kich’ŏl, and An ch’angsu), the core policy made in 
regards to land reform became decidedly radical, and came to represent the 
most progressive formation of an ideological spectrum that a South Korean 
regime could accept (Park, M. 1996: 482-483). The members of the Korean 
Democratic Party (Han’guk minjudang) criticized the people in charge of the 
Agriculture Ministry’s land reform by calling them “the Reds” (ppalkaengi) 
and the “running dog of the communists” (kongsandang apchabi) (The 
Dong-A Ilbo ed. 1975: 346; Kang 1965: 194). Truly, the initial design of land 
reform as planned by the Agriculture Ministry and based on the constitution 
was the most radical outside the proposal put forth by North Korea and the 
communist left.10 
10 For a comparison of various plans for land reform, refer to Korea Rural Economic 
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The government’s initial land reform plan was “neither a purchase with 
compensation nor absorption without compensation but an appropriation 
with a certain amount of compensation for the public well-being.”11 It was an 
opportunity to take a “third way” or “third form” that repudiated purchase-
with-compensation-and-distribution-at-a-cost as well as confiscation-
without-compensation-and-distribution-without-cost that was long wished 
for by both the left and the right (Kim, S. et al. 1989: 475-476). This “third 
way” was explained as “adopting ‘an intermediate position’ of purchase-
with-compensation-and-distribution-at-a-cost and confiscation-without-
compensation-and-distribution-without-cost” (Kang 1949: 16). The 
constitutional basis for the third way was not only laid down in Article 86 
on land reform but also in Article 15 on private property. This demonstrates 
an attempt to not only bring about a practical compromise but also an 
integration of constitutional spirit and clause. cho Pongam criticized both 
North Korean radical confiscation-without-compensation-and-distribution-
without-cost and the Korean Democratic Party/Democratic National Party’s 
scheme to try to get more compensation from the farmers, thus clearly 
displaying his support for the third way.12 
While it was a retreat from the initial plan of the Agriculture Ministry, 
the South Korean land reform that was completed before the Korean 
War basically followed a set of guidelines based on the spirit of the NFc. 
The official government report declared that “Regarding the farmland 
distribution, a total of 420,000 chŏngbo had been completely distributed to 
1,200,000 ho (household) by April 15, 1950” (National Assembly Secretariat 
1971: 507-508).
The goal of the nation and its leadership to succeed in carrying out land 
reform as a main national agenda had therefore been completed before the 
catastrophe of the Korean War. In fact, to secure support for his own land 
Institute ed., 1986, Collection of Materials Related to the History of Land Reform, pp. 
28-33; Kim, S. et al., 1989, p. 574.
11 Kang, chin guk, 1948, The Ideals of the Farmland Reform, quoted in Kim, S. et al., 
1989, p. 474.
12 “The 57th Issue of the Stenographic Records of the 2nd Regular Meeting”, Stenographic 
Records of the 2nd Regular Meeting of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, 
from the 51th issue to 88th issue, p. 124.
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reform from farmers and ordinary citizens, Rhee once strongly opposed 
the USMg’s policy on land reform, saying that the “USMg has no right 
to dispose of it [land property] without an authorization by the Korean 
Assembly” (oliver 1979: 154).
His appointment of cho Pongam to the position of Minister of Agriculture 
was also a highly strategic decision that had a sophisticated political 
undertone. With successful land reform without the active participation of 
the landlord class, Rhee anticipated the dissolution of the political basis for 
the landlord class as well as the transfer of farmer support from the radicals 
to his government, thus keeping the landlord-centered Korean Democratic 
Party in check. With the success of land reform, the foothold and influence of 
the Korean Democratic Party rapidly collapsed and farmer support for North 
Korea ended. Through land reform, the Rhee-cho Ministry accomplished its 
core national agenda by incapacitating not only the landlord-centered Korean 
Democratic Party but also the support for North Korea and the left’s radical 
revolutionary policy. In this sense, the success of Korean land reform reveals 
a well-knitted matrix of a core national agenda, a constitutional (institutional) 
basis, and leadership (the president and government official). 
III.  THE NATIoNAL FoUNDINg coNSTITUTIoN’S 
EcoNoMIc SYSTEM AND KoREA-US RELATIoNS: A 
coNFRoNTATIoN BETWEEN ‘PLAN’ AND ‘MARKET’
After the end of the Korean War, the 1954 post-war constitution significantly 
changed the statements made in the NFc on economy. What were the 
reasons and causes associated with the fundamental change of the principle 
and spirit of the socialist market economy of the NFc? There are four main 
causes that influenced the 1954 constitutional amendment on economy: the 
success of the post-colonial land reform as the key national agenda, the active 
involvement of the US, postwar reconstruction as a new national agenda, 
and the eventual approval of Rhee as the nation’s leader. The most dominant 
and compelling among these causes were the influence and pressures of the 
Americans and the strategic decisions made by Rhee while acting as Korea’s 
leader.
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First, as a result of land reform—the state-led dismantling of landlords, 
the success in putting conservatives in check, and the progressive reform 
policy to eradicate radicalism—ironically meant that the need to embrace 
farmers and their interests was no longer needed. The division between 
the North and South had become absolute after the Korean War, and the 
competition to secure farmer support between the two had ended when 
South Korean farmers pledged their support for the southern regime. Second, 
with the destruction of the war and the resources for postwar reconstruction 
absolutely scarce, the need to secure foreign aid was essential. Acquiring 
foreign aid and support when the Korean constitution advocated equal 
economy, state-ownership, state-control, and state socialism was not easy. The 
third point concerns the American economic policy in South Korea. From 
the beginning, the basic spirit and principle of the NFc and US economic 
policy in South Korea were difficult to reconcile. The discord brought a fierce 
confrontation between the two. In this sense, the major economic agreements 
and treaties between South Korea and the US, from the founding of the 
country to the amendments in the postwar constitution on the economy, 
need to be studied. 
As mentioned above, the United States perceived the articles on the 
economy in Korea’s NFc as supporting state socialism.13 While this was 
indeed so, Washington regarded the NFc not as a product of advanced 
socialism but as a product derived from traditional elements in Korean 
history with no relation to Western socialism. Washington understood that 
“The economic provisions of the constitution of the Republic of Korea are 
the outgrowth of several factors peculiar to the history of Korea and they 
represent a natural development without the background of those socialistic 
movements which grew out of individualism and capitalism in Western 
cultures. Important factors are the tradition of authoritarianism, historical 
antecedents of government ownership of property, the necessity of providing 
quickly some kind of management for former Japanese property seized by 
American military authorities and transferred to the new government, the 
social structure of Korea and the attitudes of the Korean people towards 
13 “Report on Economic Provisions of the constitution of the Republic of Korea” (March 
24, 1954).
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Japanese property, and various political events shaping constitutional 
provisions.” (Ibid.)
The analysis of these causes, excluding the explanation that the NFc’s 
articles on the economy reflected Korea’s history of authoritarianism, 
surprisingly corresponds to the truth. The US fully comprehended the basic 
spirit and principles of the NFc and its meaning in Korean history. 
American interest in and study of the NFc appeared to be more direct and 
intense after its enactment rather than during the process of its legislation. 
A long held and dominant idea was that Korea’s NFc had been designed 
by the US and USMg. However, this view is incorrect as seen in both the 
contents of the constitution and the process of its legislation. To begin with, 
the economic spirit and articles of the NFc are fundamentally different 
from that of the American constitution. For an example, during the process 
of making the  draft of the constitution prepared, he USAMIg (United 
Stated  Army Military government in Korea) officials for the US-USSR Joint 
commission stated “at no time during the work … on draft constitutional 
provisions, and in their occasional and casual consultation with a few leading 
Koreans, did they give any consideration to economic provisions such as 
government-ownership of property.” (Ibid.) This understanding was the exact 
opposite in the NFc. When we examine the translation of the NFc by the US 
immediately after its legislation, the socialistic terms used in the articles on 
economy are limited in that they reveal a simple and literal translation of the 
original text.14 This example proves that the US did not deeply intervene in 
the (legislation of the) economic articles in the NFc. 
According to the testimony and explanation of Ernest Fraenkel, a legal 
advisor at the time of the NFc’s enactment, the power structure in Korea 
was also very different from that in the US. Fraenkel explained, “It is 
misleading, however, to compare the presidential system of the constitution 
of the Republic of Korea with the American type of government. Nothing 
comparable to the power of the Senate of the United States to consent to 
14 general Headquarters Far East command, Military Intelligence Section, general 
Staff, “Selected Items for the Information of commanders and Staffs of Far East 
command,” No. 2163 (22 July 1948), No. 2164 (23 July 1948), Rg 319, E85, Box 3107; 
“Revised English Translation of constitution of the Democratic Republic of Korea” 
(16 July 1948), Rg319, E85, Box 3107.
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the appointment of executive and judicial officers (with the exception of the 
Prime Minister and the chief Justice of the Supreme court) can be found 
in the constitution of this country. The absence of both a federal system 
of government and a system of autonomous, municipal self-government 
vests in the President of the Republic of Korea executive powers on all 
levels of government. These overall powers can by no means be compared 
to the powers of the President of the United States, which are checked and 
balanced by the powers of the executive officers of the various States and 
municipalities.” After all, according to Fraenkel, the argument that Korea 
adopted the American style presidential system is nothing but “the fallacy 
of the frequently repeated statement” (Fraenkel 1999: 447-455). Even after 
accepting that there is a large difference between the outer power structure 
and its inner organization, the statement above proves that the common 
view that “the presidential system of Korea is an import of the American 
presidential system” is wrong.  
A lack of American influence was the case during the institution of the 
constitution. According to American reports concerning the activities of the 
South Korean National Assembly, “strict order were issued by the American 
command that Americans were not to interfere or to participate in any 
way in the work of the newly established National Assembly, and that these 
orders were scrupulously observed.” Thus, this document said that “the 
myth which seems to have gained some credence that Americans influenced 
the Koreans to incorporate what might be termed socialistic provisions in 
their constitution relating to government-ownership of property, is entirely 
groundless and should be permanently laid to rest.”15 With these testimonies, 
we can consistently explain how Korea’s NFc came to have a socio-economic 
spirit as well as principles and articles that are fundamentally different from 
that of the US or which the US would want to export. We can also explain 
why the confrontation between South Korea and the US became so severe 
following the founding of the state in regards to the management and 
principles of the economy and why the US tried so desperately to intervene 
to introduce a market economy system at the time of the postwar legislation. 
15 “Report on Economic Provisions of the constitution of the Republic of Korea” (24 
March 1954).
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Without these testimonies, it is impossible to explain why the US concluded 
that the articles in the Korean constitution and their orientation expressed 
state socialism. 
In September of 1948, immediately following the founding the state, 
South Korea and the US signed the “Initial Financial and Property Settlement 
between the government of the Republic of Korea and the government of 
the United States of America” (hereafter the “Initial Settlement”).16 While the 
full text consisted of fourteen items and supporting articles, the core clause in 
the Initial Settlement concerned the approval of the legitimacy of the USMg’s 
three year rule and its dealings with the economy as well as the transfer 
of every property right and duty of the USMg to the Korean government. 
Japanese-owned property was treated in this manner as well. In spite of 
certain restraints, the Initial Settlement was an official action carried out by 
the newly independent South Korea, a recovery of economic sovereignty. 
After the transfer of economic rights through the Initial Settlement, both 
countries signed the “Agreement on Aid between the Republic of Korea 
and the United States of America” (known as the “EcA Agreement”17) in 
December of 1948, which contained twelve items including a plan for aid to 
South Korea. The EcA Agreement was different from the Initial Settlement, 
as it aimed at better management and revival of the South Korean economy 
and included very strict and detailed restraints and regulations. South Korea 
had to discuss their overall economic policy with the US and had to establish 
their comprehensive economic revival policy in consultation with the US 
in order to ensure the efficient use of aid goods. Not only were the issues of 
budget, finance, trade, grain, foreign exchange, currency, and underground 
resources included in the EcA Agreement, it also regulated “the facilitation of 
private foreign investments in Korea together with the admittance of private 
foreign traders to transact business in Korea” (Article 2). The EcA Agreement 
was similar to the Initial Settlement in that it contained very detailed decrees 
16 For an excellent study of the economic relations between Korea and the US during 
Rhee’s presidential rule that is based on primary sources, see Lee, chong Won (1996); 
Lee, Dae Keun (2002).
17 It is called the ‘EcA Agreement’ or ‘EcA aid’ because it was signed based on the 
Economic cooperation Act of the US and executed by the Economic cooperation 
Administration. 
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that were controversial enough to be considered to be infringing upon 
South Korea’s economic sovereignty. After the EcA Agreement, the US 
established the Economic cooperation Administration Mission in Korea 
(the EcA delegation) in January of 1949 and began providing and carrying 
out EcA aid. conforming to the American request, South Korea drew up 
a comprehensive economic revival plan that included the First Five-Year 
Plans for Production, the Five-Year Plans for Industrial Reconstruction, 
and the Five-Year Plans for the Procurement of goods. It is very interesting 
to note that the origin of the concept of the Five-Year Plan for Economic 
Development—which is regarded as a unique feature of a planned economy 
and economic development designed by President Park chung Hee—was not 
a result of the May 16th coup d’état, but emerged long before that, during the 
Rhee government after the founding the state. 
After the outbreak of the Korean War, when South Korea and the US 
were in a fierce battle concerning the future of Korea and unification, neither 
could make an economic plan or economic measure that went beyond the 
survival of South Korea and basic relief efforts. When truce talks began, it 
became imperative to come up with a specific plan for postwar rebuilding 
and economic reconstruction. Here, Rhee’s strategy was resolute. It appeared 
to be a strategy of “securing postwar security and aid” through a hard line 
approach that opposed the truce and sought to continue the war. Rhee’s 
strategy did not simply oppose the truce but proposed new conditions for 
it, stressing the importance of a strong South Korea-US alliance and the 
securing of aid. Rhee’s plan was a huge success. It is seen immediately in the 
strong South Korea-US alliance established through the signing of the RoK-
US Mutual Defense Treaty. However, the postwar system did not singularly 
originate from the security sections of the South Korea-US alliance. The 
alliance appeared after lengthy discussions and negotiations and as a result 
of exchanging the “securing of American aid” for the “amendment of basic 
economic principles in the NFc.”
First, after comprehensive study and close discussions before the truce, 
the United Nations command and the South Korean government signed 
the “Agreement on Economic coordination between the Republic of Korea 
and the Unified command” (known as the Meyer Agreement) on May 24, 
1952. The Meyer Agreement called for the establishment of the combined 
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Economic Board (cEB) for policy coordination and adjustment, which would 
consist of one representative from South Korea and one representative from 
the US. The cEB not only managed and enforced the aid fund but also acted 
as negotiator, adjustor, and advisor on the South Korean economy as a whole. 
Everything from the basic direction of policies to the management of the 
Korean economy needed to pass through bipartisan negotiations. In fact, it 
was “something like a supreme decision-making organization on the Korean 
economy” (Lee, D. 2002: 277). Due to the war and the need for aid, the 
economic sovereignty of South Korea had to be severely restrained only four 
years after the founding of the state. According to Article 3, the South Korean 
government not only had to report to the cEB frequently on commercial 
business but was also supervised on budget, finance, and prices, and needed 
to consult on policies concerning wages, imports and exports, and foreign 
exchange prior to the ratification of these policies.18 
After the signing of the Meyer Agreement, the US dispatched various 
delegation-cum-research groups to estimate what the actual conditions 
and the size of the aid to Korea would be. The importance of the Meyer 
Agreement for South Korea, which was signed in anticipation of the truce, 
was great. First, US President Eisenhower dispatched Henry J. Taska as envoy 
and asked him to investigate, research, and report on a comprehensive plan 
for the reconstruction of the post-truce South Korean economy. This famous 
report became known as the Taska Report.  The key suggestions of the Report 
were “setting-up of the three-year economic plan for industrial reconstruction 
by the Korean government, separation of military aid and economic aid, and 
aid for relief and aid for reconstruction, need of 8,830,000 US dollars for the 
three-year of the plan, concentration of aid for economic reconstruction and 
military enforcement.” The Taska Report took on a role of an initial guide for 
US aid to South Korea after the truce. 
Second, the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) 
requested that the Robert R. Nathan Association in the US research the actual 
18 For the process of the signing of the agreement and its contents refer to Rg 469, 
REcoRDS oF THE US FoREIgN ASSISTANcE AgENcIES, 1948-61, office of Far 
Eastern operations, Korea Subject Files, 1953-59, Entry 422, Box 1.
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condition and establishment of the reconstruction plan.19 The Association 
submitted the “South Korean Economic Reconstruction Plan”—which is 
also known as the Nathan Report—to the UNKRA. Key points in the report 
were that South Korea’s rehabilitation and financial independence could be 
achieved within five years (1958-1959) provided that there was sufficient 
foreign aid and a suitable reconstruction plan; that 1.25 billion dollars in 
foreign aid was needed for this; that the UNKRA was essential to manage the 
aid fund efficiently; that South Korea had an advantage due to its excellent 
human resources; and that the government needed economic liberalization 
including prices and privatization. The third factor influential in establishing 
South Korean-US economic relations was the dispatch of the American-
Korean Foundation led by Edgar M. queeny, which is not well known and 
will be explained later.
The fourth was the dispatch of Tylor T. Wood. The American government 
dispatched Wood in August of 1953 as the cEB representative of the UN 
to work with the Korean government to establish a plan for the use of 
the aid funds. After fierce discussion and debate, the two parties signed 
the “combined Economic Board Agreement for a Program of Economic 
Reconstruction and Financial Stabilization” (the cEB Agreement) on 
December 14, 1953. While serious debate continued on various issues related 
to the direction of Korea’s economic reconstruction and the composition 
of aid goods, exchange rates, and investment priorities, the key point of 
contention concerned “economic reconstruction” (on the Korean side) 
versus “financial stabilization” (on the American side). In other words, the 
controversy centered on stabilization versus growth. Although the American 
position became dominant, the signing of the cEB Agreement was important 
in that it established the principle and direction of the postwar Korean 
economic reconstruction and it secured American aid in the rehabilitation of 
the Korean economy.
We note that within a very short period of time, American officials 
were dispatched to South Korea, from Meyer, Taska, queeny, the Robert R. 
19 This comprehensive report was immediately translated and distributed in Korea. 
See The Korea Development Bank, 1955, Nathan Report—Plan for Korea’s Economic 
Reconstruction.
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Nathan Associations, and Wood. This was a unique time when the focus of 
American teams and officials was not on Korean security or military, but on 
the economy. We can see that the postwar South Korea-US relationship was 
about the economy as much as it was about security. The cEB Agreement can 
essentially be called the founding agreement between South Korea and the 
US in regards to the postwar economic relationship, just as much as the RoK-
US Mutual Defense Treaty was in the area of security. In a letter to President 
Syngman Rhee dated December 19th and sent soon after the signing of the 
cEB Agreement, Wood wrote that “I feel the success of our common effort 
to strengthen and rebuild your country, which has stood so valiantly under 
your leadership in the forefront of the fight against communism, is of vital 
importance to the security of the whole world of free man” and “We now have 
a truly workable agreement under which we can go forward, with full respect 
for the rights and responsibilities of our two countries, toward the important 
objectives we seek.”20 We can therefore see American expectations of the cEB 
Agreement. 
IV.  FRoM THE ‘NATIoNAL FoUNDINg coNSTITUTIoN’ 
To THE ‘PoST-KoREAN WAR coNSTITUTIoN’:  
US PRESSURE AND THE EMERgENcE oF A MARKET 
EcoNoMY SYSTEM
After the signing the cEB Agreement, the Rhee administration submitted a 
bill to the National Assembly in January 23, 1954, to amend the constitution 
only on matters concerning the economy. It was the only time the Korean 
government submitted a bill concerning only issues related to the economy 
since the founding of the state in 1948. The submission of a bill to amend 
the constitution in January of 1954 was highly significant. In fact, the direct 
cause for the amendment was the recommendation of Edgar M. queeny, who 
visited Korea with the American-Korean Foundation in August of 1953, to 
20 National Archives, Rg 469, REcoRDS oF THE US FoREIgN ASSISTANcE 
AgENcIES, 1948-61, office of Far Eastern operations, Korea Subject Files. 1953-59, 
Entry 422, Box 2.
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President Rhee and his officials to transform the management of the economy 
into one that focused on private cooperation, citing that nationalization and 
other previous policies posed major obstacles to attracting foreign investment 
(Lee, c. 1996: 154). The American-Korean Foundation was a semiofficial 
organization that clearly played an incredibly influential role in Korea’s 
postwar reconstruction, but this is rarely discussed. Therefore, a detailed 
study of its role and influence is necessary.21 
A report by the Embassy of the United States in Seoul sent on March 5, 
1954 to the US Department of State admitted to America’s direct and powerful 
influence in Korea’s effort to amend the economic articles of the constitution 
by declaring that “this decision apparently reflects in part suggestions made 
by US officials and private individuals.” This was very different from the 
dealings with the NFc of 1948, when the US did not intervene out of concern 
over interfering in another country’s domestic affairs. The contents of the 
amendment were, according to the US Embassy’s understanding, “proposed 
in the National Assembly which would have the effect of substituting private 
ownership and free enterprise, as the basic economic principle underlying the 
constitution, instead of state ownership and control as at present.” In a word, 
“the significance of this proposal therefore lies mainly in the government’s 
decision to emphasize its preference for the free enterprise system at this 
particular time and to clear the way for future specific legislation.” In 
addition, the report included detailed explanations of the amendments made 
to Articles 85, 87, 88, and 89, which were key economic articles in the NFc.22 
21 Refer to the following documents concerning the American-Korean Foundation: Rg 
59, gENERAL REcoRDS oF THE DEPARTMENT oF STATE DEcIMAL FILES 
1950-54, From 895B.49/1-551 To: 896.00/4-2850, NND 832905, Box 5698: Rg 59 
gENERAL REcoRDS oF THE DEPARTMENT oF STATE, DEcIMAL FILES 
1950-54, From: 911.63/1-253 To: 911.63/11-154, NND 852928, Box 5813: Rg 469, 
REcoRDS oF THE US FoREIgN ASSISTANcE AgENcIES, 1948-61, office of 
Far Eastern operations, Korea Subject Files. 1953-59, Entry 422, Box 18, 20, 22. 
A detailed analysis is needed of the activities of the Foundation. These documents 
contain a wealth of material about the “Help Korea Train” Project that was promoted 
by the Foundation. 
22 “Amendment of Economic Articles of the RoK constitution,” Rg 469, REcoRDS 
oF THE US FoREIgN ASSISTANcE AgENcIES, 1948-61, office of Far Eastern 
operations, Korea Subject Files. 1953-59, Entry 422, Box 20.
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This clearly shows the aims of the report. 
The aims of the report are well reflected in the dialogue between Rhee 
and Wood on September 7, 1953, before the signing of the cEB Agreement 
and when the conflict between South Korea and the US was at its peak. It 
is easy to see why Rhee wanted to keep industrialization controlled by the 
state and not private companies. Rhee had been deeply disappointed by the 
lack of patriotism on the part of Korean businessmen and thought that it 
would be absurd to leave the economic recovery in their hands. Rhee thought 
that the industrial facilities, at least initially, needed to be managed by the 
government. Wood, however, disagreed by claiming that he had seen many 
businessmen who had original ideas, energy, and patriotism and asserted that 
the president underestimated the potentialities of the private enterprises.
Wood argued further that the economy and prosperity of the US were 
built by private companies and that he hoped South Korea would follow the 
same path. Rhee responded by stating that he and the Korean citizens never 
believed in socialism. When the discussion turned to finding talented private 
businesses for economic development, Wood asked what Rhee thought about 
allowing American private capital into Korea, which would not only provide 
capital but also management skills. Rhee responded that he would welcome 
American businesses as long as they were not interested in solely exploiting 
Korea for their interests. Here, Wood confirmed that there were many good 
US companies interested in foreign investment and emphasized that any 
activities without interest would not be expected from businessmen.23 
After conducting a comprehensive review of the South Korean economy 
and the constitution after the signing of the cEB Agreement,24 the US 
stated that “there are several means for overcoming apparent obstacles to 
the development of free enterprise in Korea.” and “There are several kinds 
of obstacles, and they suggest their own respective kinds of remedies: 
constitutional obstacles, for which a constitutional amendment would be 
23 Rg 469, REcoRDS oF THE US FoREIgN ASSISTANcE AgENcIES, 1948-61, 
office of Far Eastern operations, Korea Subject Files. 1953-59, Entry 422, Box 2.
24 “Report on Economic Provisions of the constitution of the Republic of Korea” 
(March 24, 1954), National Archives, Rg 469, REcoRDS oF THE US FoREIgN 
ASSISTANcE AgENcIES, 1948-61, office of Far Eastern operations, Korea Subject 
Files. 1953-59, Entry 422, Box 20. 
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required.” Saying that among the ways of overcoming the numerous restraints 
on a free enterprise, “constitutional provisions in chapter VI, Economy, 
impose absolute restrictions against ownership of some types of property” 
it specifically pointed to Articles 85, 86, 87, and 88. It was extremely hostile 
towards Article 87. It may be purely coincidental, but all of the items that 
the US found strongly questionable were those that had been included in 
the constitutional amendment designed by Korean government. It was really 
identical and quite matching.
However, even after the submission of the revised bill by the Korean 
government, the US demanded more liberal, market-friendly, and business-
friendly measures and requested a clause-by-clause analysis of the 
amendments in Articles 85, 87, and 88, saying that “The purpose expressed 
by the administration in submitting these proposals was to expand and 
encourage the individual freedom and initiative of the people in their 
economic activities, and thus to stimulate a rapid increase in productive 
capacity and efficient development of the national economy. An examination 
of the text of the proposed amendments,  indicates that if adopted they 
would not necessarily achieve the objective expressed. Ambiguities are 
introduced. Furthermore the general provisions stated would need legislative 
implementation. This is not a defeat in itself, since any such constitutional 
principle needs implementation; but the point is that free enterprise could 
not be magically introduced by merely adopting these amendments.”
In conclusion, they understood that “the task of introducing free 
enterprise into a country which has developed under a different way of life is 
difficult and cannot be accomplished by forcing on that country a complete 
new set of laws establishing a complete new set of relationships in economic 
activities. The cultural lag alone would prevent an immediate transformation. 
Some of the idealism expressed in the constitution and inherent in confucian 
influences may have worn thin during the course of the recent war. But 
enough of it lasts to constitute a serious obstacle to a complete reform at 
one time”: “A program of reform in constitution, laws and administrative 
procedures of government providing for State ownership of specified 
public service and public utility enterprises to be operated and managed by 
independent public corporations would satisfy the idealism of the Korean 
people and their aroused nationalistic pride. Efforts in the future could be 
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directed towards modifying this situation if it seemed necessary. But in the 
meantime acceptance of this situation would represent a victory in principle 
for the Koreans. The price to be specified for such an acceptance would be 
the necessary changes in constitution, laws and administrative procedures 
which would clear the road for free enterprise in the other class of economic 
activity.” In other words, a technique is needed that clarifies the way towards 
free enterprise. 
There is another important document in regards to South Korea-US post-
war relations: a letter that Rhee sent to queeny of the American-Korean 
Foundation just before submitting the bill to amend the constitution. In the 
letter written on January 12, 1954, Rhee mentioned “I would like to call your 
attention the fact that people who do not understand our economic situation 
criticize us for government ownership of public utilities and strategic 
industries in general.” He also emphasized that “this government is opposed 
to socialism in principal and has been doing all it can to encourage private 
ownership of such industries.” However, he said that “Korean businessman 
cannot undertake the ownership and operation of these industries.” This is 
the same opinion that he had earlier expressed to Wood. 
Furthermore, Rhee brought up the constitutional amendment, saying 
“concerning your comment about the constitution, as you know, the 
National Assembly has not been in complete cooperation with the Executive 
Branch of the government, and we are waiting for the election of new 
legislators to consider needed change in laws. In May, legislators, including 
members of the Senate which was created only at the end of last year, will be 
elected and when the Assembly meets amendments will be introduced and 
changes made without much difficulty. I feel sure our new Assembly will give 
consideration to and will amend Articles 85, 87 and 88 of the constitutions.25
Syngman Rhee, perhaps as a way to relieve the anxiety of the US with 
regard to the controversy regarding the constitution, informed the US in 
advance about the bill to amend the constitution. There is another point of 
great importance here. By January 12, Rhee had presumed that the bill would 
be passed in a new National Assembly to be formed after the general election 
in May. In spite of this, Rhee submitted the bill to amend the constitution on 
25 “Amendment of Economic Articles of the RoK constitution”
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January 23 to the National Assembly and withdrew it, as discussed below, on 
March 9. A significant strategic political plan can be seen from this action. 
Rhee may have planned to use the American pressure on constitutional 
matters as an opportunity to extend the term of presidency for the first 
president of the Republic of Korea. This, however, requires a more careful 
review of the materials and facts. 
V.  coNgRESSIoNAL DEBATE oN THE coNSTITUTIoN 
AND EcoNoMIc SYSTEM: THE gREAT DEBATE oF 
MARKET EcoNoMY VS. EqUAL EcoNoMY 
Fierce debates about the constitutional amendment unfolded in the National 
Assembly following the government’s proposal for the amendment bill on 
January 23, 1954. It was the second greatest debate on the political system 
since the founding of the state, the first being the dispute on the National 
Security Law of the constitutional Assembly. While the first dispute had 
been about the direction and prospect of human rights and democracy, 
the second was about the economic system. The historical meaning of this 
debate was, first, that it served as the final seal at the level of constitutional 
conflict regarding the economic system since liberation in 1945 and during 
the formation of the nation. Second, it showed the urgency of postcolonial 
reform since the time of liberation, which went through the process of 
competition between the South and the North, establishment of the country, 
and the Korean War, and symbolized the urgency of the time, which required 
an embrace of radicalism. Third, despite the fact that the debate ultimately 
ended with the incorporation of the American-led capitalistic world system 
into Korea’s economic system, it showed that the market economy system was 
not simply implanted without mediation or internal struggle, for it only took 
root after a fierce internal battle that lasted until the end. Fourth, considering 
the meaning of the constitution in the modern state, Korea’s state system, 
core managing principle, and, to put it in a more abstract manner, its raison 
d’être were equipped with a social consensus, stability in the area of the 
economy (a market economy system), stable foreign relations, and tenable 
national security (the South Korea-US alliance), not in 1948 at the time of the 
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founding the state, but in 1954. 
The government’s explanation of the proposal was nearly identical to the 
US proposal for a more liberal economy. considering the turbulent disputes 
and conflicts of past years with the US, the explanations provided for its 
decisions to override or amend the NFc seemed no longer to be coming 
from the same government that had come to power after the constitution 
was established six years before. Let us inspect the specific contents of the 
proposal. The proposal was made on January 23, 1954 and brought before 
the National Assembly on February 25 by President Rhee and all his cabinet 
members.26 We can see that the president and government, which had 
previously opposed the amendment, were now taking the lead in proposing a 
new amendment. As shown below, the amendment in the economic articles 
of the PKWc, which was confirmed on November 29, 1954, were, except for 
minor modifications, no different from what was initially submitted. 
Art. 85 Exploitation, development or utilization of mines and other important under-
ground resources, marine resources, water power and all other economically 
available natural powers shall be in accordance with the provisions of law.
Art. 87 Any enterprises having public character shall be managed by the government 
or by juridical persons of public law. When required, such enterprises shall 
be licensed to private individuals in accordance with the provisions of law. 
Foreign trade shall be controlled by the government in accordance with the 
provisions of law.
Art. 88 Private enterprises cannot be transferred to state or public ownership, or their 
management cannot be placed under control or direction of the state or juridi-
cal persons of public law, except when it is deemed urgently necessary in order 
to meet urgent necessities of national defense or national life in accordance 
with the provisions of law.
Art. 89 Article 15. Paragraph 3 of this constitution shall be applicable to the transfer 
of private enterprises to state or public ownership as provided in Article 86. 
First, regarding Article 85, the government openly questioned the 
clauses in the NFc that “Mines and other important mineral resources, 
26 National Assembly Library, 1968, Materials for the History of the Constitutional 
Government, Volume 3—Proceedings of the Constitutional Amendment during the 
Second National Assembly, pp. 164-166.
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marine resources, water power and natural powers which may be utilized 
economically shall be owned by the State” by saying that this was “a problem 
in respect to private property and private management” and said that 
it should not be decided by the constitution but by law in a way that is 
“appropriately flexible to the state of things at the time.” The government 
made itself more than clear that the reason for the 1954 constitutional 
amendment of the economic articles was that it intended to abolish state-
ownership and strengthen the principle of private property and a market 
economy. 
on Article 87, the amendment bill wanted to strike out the whole of 
Part I, which was about government and public management: “Important 
transportation and communication enterprises, financial and insurance 
institutions, electricity, irrigation, water supplies, gas and any enterprises 
having public character shall be managed by the government or by juridical 
persons of public law. When required by public necessity such enterprises 
shall be licensed to private individuals in accordance with the provisions 
of law and licenses shall be cancelled in accordance with the provisions of 
law.” The government explained this removal as being “in the spirit of the 
promotion of private enterprise, to make it possible to broaden the possibility 
of acquiring licenses by providing that the provisions of law relax the 
condition for public enterprises to be licensed.” It is clear from this that the 
government intended to promote private enterprise. Part II was also eased in 
order to ensure that the standard of government control was to be under the 
jurisdiction of the law, not the constitution. 
The intent of the amendment of Article 88 was also clearly to deny the 
spirit of the NFc, which had defined the state and public ownership. The 
proposal for the amendment stated that Article 88 “focused on the possibility 
that private enterprises can be transferred to state or public ownership or 
that their management can be placed under the control or direction of the 
state or juridical persons of public law” and asserted that “while respecting 
private enterprises, move the focus to the opposite side after which private 
enterprises cannot be transferred to state or public ownership, or their 
management cannot be placed under the control or supervision of the state or 
juridical persons of public law, except when it is deemed urgently necessary 
in order to meet urgent necessities of national defense or national well-
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being in accordance with the provisions of law.” The amendment was clearly 
promoting respectful private enterprises and against the spirit and principle 
of the NFc.
Regarding Article 89, the government explained that, among the applicable 
clauses from articles 85 to 88, “the expropriation or use of the right to cancel 
licenses in Article 85 and 87 shall be fully provided in the law; the pertinent 
clauses in Article 85 and 87 are to be deleted and restricted in Article 86 and 
88.” The applicable scope of Article 89 was therefore scaled down by placing 
the relevant clauses in Article 85 and 87 under the jurisdiction of the law. 
As a result of this proposal by the government, debate fiercer than that 
during the legislation of the NFc in 1948 developed in the National Assembly, 
although it may be more accurate to say that the true argument about the 
economic system that did not occur at the time of founding of the state finally 
began. The spirit of the clauses pertaining to the economy in the NFc had 
been accepted without any intense dispute due to the social consensus since 
the time of the Korean Provisional government and the strong postcolonial 
demands at the time. Because the 1954 constitution sought to overturn Korea’s 
long social consensus, however, a forceful argument had ensued.27 It is very 
interesting to note that the dispute on the economy and social system in 1954 
had not occurred in 1948. The confrontation can be summed up as a dispute 
between equal economy supporters versus the market economy supporters 
and had the appearance of a dispute between republicanism and liberalism. 
The main focus of the dispute is described in the following paragraphs.
The questions raised by members of the National Assembly who opposed 
the amendments (chŏn chinhan, chang Hongyŏm, ch’oe Kukhyŏn, chŏng 
Namguk, Yi Yongsŏl, Im Kibong, Pak ch’ŏrung) are as follows. First, did 
the economic effect and influence of the NFc fail so considerably that an 
amendment bill was required? Was the spirit of the NFc ever truly observed 
27 National Assembly Library, 1968, Materials for the History of the Constitutional 
Government, Volume 3—Proceedings of the Constitutional Amendment during the 
Second National Assembly; National Assembly Library, 1968, Materials for the History 
of the Constitutional Government, Volume 4—Proceedings of the Constitutional 
Amendment during the Second National Assembly. Further research is required 
that interprets the discussions in these two proceedings based on the liberalist and 
federalist theory of the constitution. 
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and practiced? Second, was South Korea at a stage where a market economy 
and liberal enterprises could be adopted? Third, if South Korea was to 
receive foreign aid, why was a constitutional amendment necessary? Would 
a legal revision be enough? Fourth, was the possibility of foreign economic 
domination being considered? Wouldn’t there be a danger in allowing colonial 
exploitation of the economy as the British and French had done in Iran, India, 
and Indochina? Shouldn’t “national capital” or “native capital” (minjok chabon) 
be fostered first? Fifth, was this not promoting an oligopoly by granting 
freedom to conglomerates? Would a class struggle not follow the deepening 
inequality and the permitting of rich-get-richer and poor-get-poorer methods? 
To refute the criticisms of the opposition, the government (Prime Minister 
Paek Tujin) and those who supported the bill in the National Assembly (Kwak, 
Sang Hun, Sŏ, Pŏm Sŏk, cho, chu Yŏng, Kim, Pong Jae, Pak, Yŏng ch’ul, 
Yŏ, Un Hong, cho, Kwang Sŏp) argued that first it would not be a complete 
transformation from a command economy to a market economy. Second, 
the laws and institutions already set up by the government would be enough 
to safeguard an equal society even if the amendment passed. Third, the 
introduction of foreign capital was absolutely necessary because the economy 
was in tatters. Fourth, how much foreign capital would come in was more 
worrisome than an economic invasion by foreign capital, as the latter could 
be sufficiently regulated. Furthermore, fear of foreign capital could only be 
described as suicidal patriotism, and those who adhered to it were narrow-
minded isolationists and ultra-nationalists. Fifth, because the clauses on 
state ownership stood in the path of receiving foreign capital, resolving the 
shattered economy with an amendment was a reasonable argument. Sixth, 
an amendment was needed to ensure the autonomy and creativity of the 
enterprises and so that the concern over the monopolization of corporation, 
capital, and market could easily be regulated by policies. 
However, in addition to the battle over economics, which most clearly 
presented differing views since the founding of the state, the issues concerning 
the constitution at the time had a political dimension. In light of the 
movement to abolish the restriction on the reelection of the first president by 
a faction of the Liberal Party and right-wing organizations that began after 
the government’s withdrawal of the proposal on March 9, 1954, it is clear that 
Syngman Rhee intended to change the power structure using economic issues 
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via his demand (the extension of his term) in conjunction with the American 
demand (the constitutional amendment on the economy). considering that 
the provisions of the constitution were a compromise of power, the transfer 
of a power structure for an economic system was an exchange that could be 
fairly attempted. consequently, Rhee succeeded in establishing both. Judging 
from the movement by the right-wing political parties and supporters of the 
Liberal Party to abolish the restriction on the reelection of the first president 
after the March 9th withdrawal, attempting such an “equation of exchange” was 
worthwhile. That is, when the constitutional amendment on the economic 
articles became unavoidable due to American pressure, the revision regarding 
the reelection restriction was added. In fact, one faction of the demonstrators 
in the movement stemmed from the right-wing organizations that had 
participated in the Pusan Incident of 1952 (Pusan chŏngch’i p’adong).28 The 
same applies to the other political parties and the National Assembly, including 
part of the Liberal Party. The meeting of the committee for the Promotion of 
the constitutional Amendment (Hŏnbŏp kaejŏng ch’ujin wiwŏnhoe) held on 
April 30 and again on May 3 sought permission to allow a lifetime term solely 
for the first president, proving and demonstrating that the movement for the 
constitutional amendment began before the general Election of May 20. This 
portrays Rhee as a cunning and experienced politician.29 
In terms of economic issues, part of the blame for the dispute in the 
National Assembly can be placed on the ruling Liberal Party’s creed, which 
did not match the government’s proposal for the amendment regarding the 
market economy. The Liberal Party from the beginning clearly envisioned 
itself, similar to the NFc, as champions of the tenets of the public good, 
harmony, denial of class, and cooperation—rather than of the individual, 
private property, and competition—as shown in its declaration of the 
foundation of the party, its political creed, and its policies. The declaration of 
28 “Political Development in the RoK,” Rg 469, REcoRDS oF THE US FoREIgN 
ASSISTANcE AgENcIES, 1948-61, office of Far Eastern operations, Korea Subject 
Files. 1953-59, Entry 422, Box 13.
29 Regarding the movement and the trends for the constitutional amendment of 1954, 
refer to Rg 469, REcoRDS oF THE U.S. FoREIgN ASSISTANcE AgENcIES, 
1948-61, office of Far Eastern operations, Korea Subject Files. 1953-59, Entry 422, 
Box 12, 13, 20.
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the foundation of the Liberal Party clearly stipulated that “the construction 
of a cooperative society following the economic system for a cooperative life 
and where everyone can live together and every nation can mutually prosper 
while every state can stand side by side” was the historical mission for the 
party. The key contents in their political creed and policy sought to eradicate 
exploitation by the monopolizing ruling elite, to abolish class distinctions, to 
remove prestige, and to close the gap between the rich and the poor, while 
supporting and promoting pantisocracy; the rights and interests of laborers, 
farmers, and working mass as citizens in a democracy; the idea of mutual 
help; the construction of a cooperative world, the realization of public justice 
in terms of the coexistence, co-prosperity, and mutual cooperation between 
labor and capital; and the protection of another’s freedom before one’s own, 
among other ideals (National Election commission, 1965: 124-126). A clear 
characteristic was the denial and exclusion of modern liberalism and the 
capitalist ideology that promoted self-interest, class structure, individualism, 
and competition, in a fashion identical to that of the NFc. 
A comparison between the economic articles of the 1948 NFc and the 
PKWc as established on November 29, 1954 is presented in the following 
table.
National Founding constitution (1948) Post-War constitution (1954)
Art. 84. The principle of the economic order of the 
Korean Republic shall be to realize social justice, to 
meet the basic demands of all citizens and to en-
courage the development of a balanced economy. 
Within the limits of the foregoing paragraph the 
economic freedom of each individual shall be 
guaranteed.
No changes
Art. 85. Mines and other important mineral re-
sources, marine resources, water power and natu-
ral powers that may be utilized economically shall 
be owned by the State. In order to utilize and de-
velop such resources, licenses shall, in case of pub-
lic necessity, be granted for a limited period to pri-
vate persons in accordance with the provisions of 
law and shall be cancelled in accordance with the 
provisions of law.
Article 85. Licenses to exploit, de-
velop, or utilize mines and other 
important underground resources, 
marine resources, water power and 
all other economically available 
natural powers may be granted for 
limited periods in accordance with 
the provisions of law.
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National Founding constitution (1948) Post-War constitution (1954)
Art. 86. Farmland shall be distributed to self-tilling 
farmers. The method of distribution, the extent of 
possession, and the nature and restrictions of own-
ership shall be determined by law.
No changes
Art. 87. Par. 1. Important transportation and com-
munication enterprises, financial and insurance 
institutions, electricity, irrigation, water supply, gas 
and any enterprises having a public character shall 
be managed by the government or by juridical per-
sons of public law. When required by public neces-
sity such enterprises shall be licensed to private in-
dividuals in accordance with the provisions of the 
law and licenses shall be cancelled in accordance 
with the provisions of the law.
Abolished
Art. 87. Par. 2. Foreign trade shall be under the 
control of the government.
Article 87. Foreign trade shall be 
controlled by the government in ac-
cordance with the provisions of law.
Art. 88. In order to meet urgent necessities of na-
tional defense or national life, private enterprises 
shall be transferred to state or public ownership, or 
their management shall be placed under the con-
trol or supervision of the state or juridical persons 
of public law, when it is deemed urgently necessary 
in accordance with provisions of law.
Article 88. Private enterprises shall 
not be transferred to State or public 
ownership, except in cases specifi-
cally designated by law to meet ur-
gent necessities of national defense 
or national life, nor shall their man-
agement or operation be controlled 
by the State or by juridical persons 
organized by public law.
Art. 89. Article 15, Par. 2 of this constitution shall 
be applicable to the cancellation of a license and 
the expropriation, use, or restriction of property as 
provided in Arts. 85-88. 
(Art. 15. The right of property shall be guaranteed. 
Its nature and restrictions shall be defined by law. 
The exercise of property rights shall conform to 
public welfare. Expropriation and the use or re-
striction of private property for public purposes 
shall be accompanied by due compensation in ac-
cordance with the provisions of law.)
Article 89. Article 15. Paragraph 
3 of this constitution shall be ap-
plicable to the expropriation of 
farmland as provided in Articles 86 
and shall also be applicable to the 
transfer of private enterprises to the 
State or to public ownership as pro-
vided in the foregoing Article.
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VI. coNcLUSIoN
The conclusion of this paper—based on primary sources and with Korea’s 
national agenda, constitution, and leadership as variables—on the National 
Founding constitution (NFc) and the post-war constitution is as follows. 
First, the National Founding constitution of 1948 was not, given the 
condition that the key national agenda was land reform, aiming to establish 
a liberal market economy but was closer to supporting a socialist market 
economy or a social democracy that stipulated strong involvement from 
the state. This was in accordance with the tradition of the state’s republican 
involvement in the economy since the time of the Korean Provisional 
government. A third way in which both the capitalist market economy 
and the socialist planned economy were eschewed had been a result of a 
social consensus in Korea that had been existed at the time of the Korean 
Provisional government. 
Second, the South Korean government under President Rhee was able to 
carry out land reform successfully, the major post-colonial national agenda, 
by utilizing the spirit and articles of the constitution. This led to the collapse 
of the radical left and had a decisive influence on the expansion of a support 
base consisting of the peasant class. Farmer support and yearnings for North 
Korea also ended. At the same time, the influence of the landlord class and 
the Korean Democratic Party, the leading opponents of the land reform, was 
drastically decreased. In other words, the success of the land reform had three 
lasting effects in South Korea: the expansion of support for the government, 
the collapse of the landlord class, and the downfall of the left. It was the result 
of a perfect combination of the key national agenda of land reform, the spirit 
and principles of the constitution that reflected the national agenda, and the 
leadership of President Rhee. 
Third, during the course of the Korean War, the constitution of Korea 
changed from an equal economy system or state capitalist system to a market 
economy system in order to secure aid in post-war reconstruction. Reflecting 
the change in the spirit and contents of the constitution, a new national 
agenda emerged—due to the success of land reforms and the collapse of 
the left—to fulfill and promote post-colonial economic reform, post-war 
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reconstruction, and the acceptance of foreign aid. Thus, the market economy 
system of Korea, at least according to the norm and spirit of the constitution, 
was laid not in 1948 at the time of national foundation, but in 1954. 
Fourth, the revision of the chapter on the economy in the constitution, 
although not well known, was due to strong American pressure. Washington 
directly and fiercely questioned the Korean state’s excessive involvement 
in the economy and the shrinking of market autonomy, arguing that the 
socialist orientation of and the articles in the National Founding constitution 
enabled this. This led to a conflict between Seoul and Washington regarding 
the articles in the constitution and the role of the state in the economy, but 
in the end Seoul was obligated to revise the chapter on the economy in the 
constitution to support a market economy in order to secure US aid. The US 
saw the 1948 constitution as too egalitarian and as promoting state socialism. 
Thus, Washington felt the need to hold back Rhee’s excessive involvement 
in an economy that was not oriented towards a market economy system and 
tried to realize this through a constitutional amendment. 
Fifth, Rhee’s leadership embraced the American demands for a 
constitutional amendment. Seen in terms of the actual contents of the 
amendment, Rhee, who initially opposed the amendment, seems to have 
used a strategy of exchange in which he exchanged politics for economy 
and the power structure for the economic system in order to run again for 
the presidency for a third consecutive time and gain aid and support from 
the United States. Rhee’s exchange strategy, from a broad point of view on 
state development, led to a combination of “the regression of democracy and 
development of the market economy.”
Sixth is in regards to the effects and consequences of the amendment. The 
post-war constitution led to a change of the Korean economic system and 
its entry into the market economy system, an increase in American aid and 
the changes of its content, the success of post-war reconstruction, and the 
establishment for the basis of the Korean market economy. It is questionable 
whether Korea’s post-war reconstruction could have been successful without 
its transition to a market economy system at the time.30 The constitutional 
30 Regarding the conflicts, the post-war constitutional amendment, ideology, and line 
and policy on national economic development see Park, T. (2000).
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amendment, more than anything else, was heavily influenced by the 
quantity and quality of American aid and therefore soon became a legal 
and institutional tool for South Korea’s post-war economic development. 
Additionally, because the norms and spirit of the constitution at the time 
have been maintained without fundamental changes thus far, it can be said 
that the amendment provided enabling conditions as well as confining 
conditions in the trajectory of the development of Korean society. From a 
broader standpoint, this marked the beginning of modern Korea’s market 
economy in earnest.31 
In conclusion, regarding the initial question of this paper, the comparison 
between the National Founding constitution (NFc) and the Post-
War constitution, Korea’s early national agenda (economic reform), the 
institution/constitution of Korea, and Korea’s national leadership, uncovers 
mutual correspondence and relational dynamics. In other words, there is a 
very strong correlation among the national agendas of land reform and post-
war reconstruction, the principle and articles of the constitution, and Korean 
leadership. The leadership in the first republic inserted specific articles in the 
clauses on economy in the constitution to carry out its national agenda by 
changing the economic articles in the constitution. This demonstrates one 
of the most important characteristics of Korean democracy, that being the 
consensus about socio-economic reform and its realization. The problem 
of objectively measuring the accord or discord between the constitutional 
norms and the reality in the world, i.e., to measure objectively the size of the 
effect and influence of the constitutional norms on the real world, belongs to 
another study in the future. 
31 In this regard, the experience of Korea may be thought of as an example of 
constitutional originalism, as discussed in-depth in constitutional studies and 
in political theory on the historical roles of the early spirit and principle of the 
constitution. constitutional originalism in Korea could go back to the Korean 
Provisional government of the colonial period, but such an investigation is beyond 
the scope of this paper. Refer to the following for a recent discussion on constitutional 
originalism: o’Neill (2005); goldford (2006); Park, S. (2006).
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